How battlefield technology in Ukraine is a game changer for modern wars
In the shadowy world of covert intelligence operations, in the past year, there have been two major standouts for their use of technology to strike a devastating blow to their adversaries. I’ve already spoken about the Mossad ‘Grim Beeper’ pager operation that decimated Hezbollah and what a stunning operation that was from conception to execution. More recently, however, the Ukrainians demonstrated just how impressive their innovation and use of technology has become. Rather than writing about it, take a look at this cracking little video which really explains in simple terms the Ukrainian Operation Spider Web.
I don’t think there is a single intelligence professional in the world who didn’t watch this operation and fail to be impressed. The planning, logistics, training, adaptation, rehearsals, constant alterations, coordination, but, more than anything, the fact that nothing was leaked, is incredible in and of itself. The Russian surveillance net over Ukraine is comprehensive to say the least, encompassing all platforms of SIGINT, ELINT, OSINT, HUMINT etc. If, as the Ukrainians state, this operation was in the planning phase for 18 months, the fact that it wasn’t discovered by the Russians is nothing short of remarkable.
One of the more interesting questions being raised at the moment is: Who knew?
According to President Zelensky, this was an organic, Ukraine-driven operation carried out as preemptive self defence on receipt of intelligence that Russia was planning an imminent bombing campaign. NATO leaders claim no advance knowledge of the operation. And in America, President Trump’s public reaction on his platform of choice was that the USA should have been informed as they should be leading on all decisions. Taken at face value, it would appear that Zelensky assessed Trump’s cosiness with Vladimir Putin as a massive risk to compromising the operation if he informed the Americans. Indeed, in Trump’s subsequent telephone call with Putin, not Zelensky, Trump’s language indicated more sympathy for the Russian position than that of Ukraine. So, again on the face of it, Zelensky was right not to have informed the Americans. But could Ukraine really have pulled off this masterstroke alone?
Many of my former colleagues and associates are split on this. The nay camp point out that the requirement for up to date satellite imagery of the target airfields alone, required external assistance and capabilities. They highlight the fact that the furthest target in Siberia is actually closer to Alaska than it is Ukraine. The aye’s point out that Ukraine has been becoming more and more innovative and successful in their deployment of battle tech as well as their extensive use of HUMINT sources in Russia to aid targeting and surveillance. They reminded me of the fact that very recently, Putin’s helicopter was scrambled to safety after a Ukrainian incursion surprised the Russian’s with it’s alarming proximity to the Russian leader’s location.
The CIA have, until recently, had a very close working relationship with the Ukrainians, in fact, it’s probably the closest partnership I have seen for decades. This changed radically with the Trump administration entering the White House.
Or did it?
The CIA program would not have been pulled instantly. A little known fact is that, from 2015 onwards, the CIA and the USA as a whole, gained a trove of intelligence on Russian capabilities provided by the Ukrainian intelligence services. Key information on leadership, ORBATs, decision making chains, military and cyber technology in the battle space, and lots more. Intelligence that saved the USA billions in collection efforts and streamlining countermeasures, further reducing operational costs. The CIA also used Ukrainian intelligence operatives abroad, posing them as Russians to infiltrate or recruit assets on the CIA’s behalf. In return, the CIA mentored and trained the Ukrainian intelligence services to a very high standard, to the point where the pupils were outperforming the masters as necessity became the mother of invention. On more than one occasion, the CIA had to pull on the reins of their protégés in order to assess the fallout from surprise operations the Ukrainians were about to initiate. The relationship between the Agency and the Ukrainians was formed and fostered by a very capable CIA Station Chief, nicknamed ‘Santa’ by the Ukrainians for his snow-white beard. Santa drove the working partnership and made deep connections with his counterparts who even today, speak very fondly of him.
When the Trump administration had time to look at what the CIA were doing in Ukraine, they were probably stunned at the breadth of the Agency’s involvement. With Trump seeking closer ties to Putin, the CIA was directed to minimise their activity. I’ve heard from sources that, while this was anticipated and many facets of the ongoing operations were reclassified as ‘observing or mentoring’, it was still a blow to the teams on the ground and the Ukrainians themselves. Fast forward to the debacle of Zelensky’s visit to the Oval Office and Ukraine was left in no doubt that the new administration was not sympathetic to their cause. In fact, quite the opposite. And not because Trump et al were concerned about peace in the region, but because Zelensky had previously refused to make a false statement regarding Hunter Biden, former president Joe Biden’s son. Trump had personally requested that Zelensky make a public, formal statement that Hunter had been involved in illegal/underhand business deals in Ukraine under his father’s umbrella. Zelensky refused to compromise himself and inevitably found himself, like anyone else who didn’t kiss the ring, on Trump’s ever expanding shit list.
After the disastrous White House meeting, the USA then switched off all intelligence sharing with Ukraine, leaving the country reliant upon European partners to maintain forewarning of Russian attacks and assist in targeting. After a short period where Zelensky’s public apology was seen as acceptable to the White House, the intelligence sharing was resumed. Where we read ‘intelligence sharing’, we should interpret that as CIA and NSA in the main. So, even though we don’t hear anything about them, it is highly likely an operational force of the CIA remains active in Ukraine. Would they have had any involvement in Operation Spider Web? Undoubtedly. At one end of the scale, it may have just been knowledge of the operation, a courtesy from the Ukrainians. In the middle, it’s possible that satellite feeds, ELINT and SIGINT intelligence was provided to assist in the coordination. At the pointy end of the scale, full inclusion in the planning and execution of the operation. The CIA’s main Red Line in Ukraine has always been no direct killing of Russians. Even to the layman, that phrase is very open to interpretation and is probably taken as a very broad directive.
So, could the Ukrainians have pulled off one of the most impressive military operations in recent history? With all the coordination of tech, transport, targeting, air defence countermeasures, operational integrity over 18 months?
Possibly.
But my suspicion would lead me to believe that they had significant support in this endeavour. Under the Trump administration, I don’t think it likely that any White House approval was asked or given, as, like Zelensky, I don’t trust that the key leaders of the administration wouldn’t have derailed Spider Web or informed the Russians. But support and assistance from the CIA? I’m almost certain this was the case. Would the CIA have had to seek authorisation from the White House for involvement in this operation? That’s a tough one to answer but one I think I can speculate upon based on my own experiences. If the Ukrainians had received intelligence that Russia was about to conduct a heavy bombing campaign and conducted Spider Web as preemptive self defence, the CIA could legitimately claim that this was a justifiable operation in accordance with their Permissions, therefore, no need for authorisation as it fell within current operational directives. That would obviously a very broad interpretation of the rules but . . . not wrong.
Another recent piece of information that hit the press was the fact that Trump does not read his daily intelligence briefs. In fact, since taking office, he’s only read 14. In comparison and in the same time frame, former presidents Biden received 90, and Obama, 63. Tulsi Gabbard, Trump’s Director of National Intelligence has admitted frustration at the President not taking these briefs which not only inform him, but inform American foreign policy. Taking this fact into consideration, is it possible that Trump missed the initial information that Spider Web was in the offing? It would, undoubtedly, have been couched in very general terms, completely underplaying the nature and scope of the operation. But to a President who, even when he receives the minimum amount of briefings is not particularly interested, the information could easily have gone under his radar. So maybe the CIA did kinda let the White House know something was waiting in the wings, but also knew it wouldn’t be picked up as anything unusual.
Operation Spider Web was a resounding success for the Ukrainians and one that showed the rapidly changing face of the new battlefield. Drone warfare has evolved to become as integral to the fight as a soldier’s rifle, but far, far more effective. And while the UK, Europe, and, to a lesser extent, America, are praising this audacious operation, others have been watching and learning from it also. Rogue nations and failed and hostile states just woke up to the fact that a small fleet of drones costing a few hundred dollars each can wreak havoc costing billions of dollars of damage as well as death and destruction. So, as well as being impressed by the Ukrainian operation and seeking to emulate it against our own adversaries, we have to turn our thoughts in the opposite direction:
How do we defend against it?